Small Business and Government Procurement by Schreiber, Albert N.
SMALL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT
ALBEnr N. SCHMEBE*
Small business has been singled out by the federal government for special treat-
ment as stated in the following declaration of policy:
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise is free competition....
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist,
and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to
preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total purchases
and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the Government (including but
not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be
placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of
Government property be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the
overall economy of the Nation.1
In order to aid in the carrying out of these policies the Small Business Administra-
tion was established,2 and the policies have been incorporated in the provisions of the
statutes and appropriation bills for the various procurement agencies of the federal
government, who in turn have issued regulations concerning the implementation of
these policies within their own procedures. The two most important of these
regulations are the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) which applies
to purchases by the Department of Defense,' and the Federal Procurement Regula-
tions (FPR) which apply to purchases by civilian procurement agencies.
The Small Business Administration and the various government procurement
agencies have a number of programs designed to assist small business to obtain con-
tracts and subcontracts on government work. The major programs are as follows:
i. Procurement officers are required to afford small business concerns an equitable
opportunity to compete for contracts.
2. An elaborate reporting system has been established to provide information on
the amount of purchases placed with small business. The statistics thus gen-
erated are used to encourage and evaluate the performance of procurement
officers in placing contracts with small business.
3. Many agencies have representatives on a full or part-time basis assigned to
act as advisers and specialists within their agency and to cooperate with repre-
* B.S. 1938, Illinois Institute of Technology; M.B.A. 1947, Harvard Business School. Professor of
Business Policy and Production Management, University of Washington. Co-author, DEFENSE PaocUvE-
MENT AND SMALL BUSINESS (g6r).
1 72 Stat. 384 (1958), as amended, 75 Stat. 667 (1961), z5 U.S.C. § 63x(a) (Supp. x963).
2 72 Stat. 384 (1958), as amended, 75 Stat. 757 (596z), x5 U.S.C. § 633 (1963).
' NASA Procurement Regulations are, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with ASPR, since
both are governed by the same procurement law of Chapter 137 of Title so, U.S. Code.
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sentatives of the Small Business Administration to further the small business
program.
4. The small business set-aside program provides for selection of specific procure-
ments or classes of like items or services to be restricted for placement with
small business concerns.
5. The Small Business Administration has statutory authority to certify the com-
petency of any small business concern as to capability and credit. This aids the
small business concern to establish itself as a responsible supplier.
6. The small business subcontracting program requires government prime con-
tractors to take positive action to subcontract with small business concerns.
In prime contracts of less than $500,ooo the contractor is obliged to place the
maximum amount of subcontracting with small business which is consistent
with the efficient performance of the contract. For larger prime contracts the
contractor is required to undertake a number of additional specific responsi-
bilities designed to assure that small business concerns are considered fairly in
the subcontracting role and to impose similar responsibilities on major sub-
contractors.
7. Small businesses are kept informed of opportunities for contracts and sub-
contracts and are given special assistance in submitting bids and meeting
government regulations through widespread publicity, district offices, and gov-
ernment representatives.
These programs, along with others, and with many detailed procedures, such as
splitting a large procurement quantity into smaller lots so that they are feasible within
small business capabilities, all provide means for furthering the participation of small
business concerns in government procurement. These programs are in addition to
the small business loan program and the program for small business investment
companies which help provide funds for small business concerns that in turn may
aid them to obtain government contracts as well as other kinds of business.
In table one the purchases from business firms for 1963 fiscal year by the federal
government are shown; 17.6 per cent of the total purchases made went to small
business firms. By far the largest dollar purchases came from the Department of
Defense which supplied over three-fourths of the procurement from small business
firms by the federal government. .
As shown in the last column of table one there is a wide variation between the
various executive agencies with reference to the proportion of their procurement
placed with small business firms. Within the agencies of the Department of Defense,
this characteristic is also present as shown by the data in table two. An obvious
reason for this variation in the proportion of procurements placed with small business
firms is the character of the goods and services being procured. Clothing or office
supplies obviously provide a better opportunity for small business than large military
weapons or missiles which require the capabilities of large business firms.
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TABLE x
PuRcHAsEs jay FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM BUSINESS FIRMS
FISCAL YEAR 1963 (JULY 1962-JUNE 1963)
(Amounts in Millions of Dollars)
Purchases from Total
Small Business Purchases Small Business
- as a Percentage of
Agency Amount Per cent Amount Per cent Total
Department of Defense $4,301 76.0 $27,144 78.5 15.8
Nat'l Aero. & Space Admin. 191 3.4 2,268 6.6 84.4
Atomic Energy Commission 84 1.5 2,600 7.5 3.2
Sub Total 4,576 80.9 32,012 92.6 14.3
Other Executive Agencies:
General Services Administration 329 5.8 812 2.4 40.5
Department of Interior 182 3.2 430 1.2 42.3
Veterans Administration 112 2.0 221 0.6 50.8
Department of Agriculture 95 1.7 122 0.4 78.3
Federal Aviation Agency 64 1.1 165 0.5 38.7
Tennessee Valley Authority 63 1.1 158 0.5 39.8
Department of Commerce 58 1.0 240 0.7 24.1
Department of Treasury 44 0.8 107 0.3 41.0
Department of Health, Education
and Welfare 41 0.7 82 0.2 50.5
Department of Justice 21 0.4 39 0.1 53.6
Post Office Department 18 0.3 29 0.1 60.6
U. S. Information Agency 16 0.3 32 0.1 50.7
Agency for Intem'l Development 13 0.2 35 0.1 37.6
All others (none over $7,000,000) 31 0.5 60 0.2 51.5
Sub Total-Other Executive
Agencies 1,087 19.1 2,332 7.4 46.6
Grand Total $5,663 100.0% $34,344 100.0% 17.6%
Source: Department of Defense. Atomic Energy Comml ion and General Services Administration.
TABLE 2
PuRcHAsEs BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FROM BUSINESS FIRMS
FISCAL YEAR 1963 (JULY 1962-JUNE 1963)
(Amounts in Millions of Dollars)
Purchases from Total
Small Business Purchases Small Business
-ras a Percentage of
Agency Amount Per cent Amount Per cent Total
Navy $1,193 27.8 S 7,804 28.8 15.3
Army 1,181 27.4 5,681 20.9 20.8
Air Force 978 22.8 11,189 41.2 8.7
Defense Supply Agency 943 21.9 2,326 8.6 40.5
Other Defense Agencies 6 0.1 144 0.5 4.2
Total $4,301 100.0% $27,144 100.0% 15.8%
Source: Office of Secretary of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcondrad Paymcnt, July 1002-Juno 1063, p. O.
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TABLE 3
PURCHASES BY PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS BY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FROM BUSINESS FIRMS
FISCAL YEA 1963 (JULY 1962-JUNE 1963)
(Amounts in Millions of Dollars)
Purchases from Total
Small Business Purchases Small Business
as a Percentage of
Agency Amount Per cent Amount Per cent Total
All actions of less than $10,000 $1,399 32.6 $2,609 9.6 53.6
Construction 584 13.6 1,132 4.2 51.5
Misc. Hard Goods 363 8.4 1,133 4.2 32.0
Electronic & Comm. Equipment 358 8.3 3,061 11.3 11.7
Services 318 7.4 1,504 5.5 21.1
Subsistence 301 7.0 586 2.2 51.3
Fuels & Lubricants 177 4.1 877 3.2 20.2
Textiles, Clothing & Equipage 162 3.8 259 0.9 62.5
Ships 160 3.7 1,683 6.2 9.5
Aircraft 154 3.6 5,479 20.2 2.8
Missiles 109 2.4 6,689 24.6 1.6
Ammunition 99 2.3 886 3.3 11.2
Tanks-Automotive 71 1.7 1,032 3.8 6.9
Weapons 46 1.1 214 0.8 21.7
Total $4,301 100.0% 827,144 100.0% 15.8%
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Prime Contrac Awards and Subcontrad Payments, July 1962-June 1963, p. 20.
TABLE 4
PURCHASES BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS
FISCAL YEARS 1951-1963
(Millions of Dollars)
Dep't of NASA Other
Year Defense & AEC Agencies Total
1951 ...................................... $6,436
1952 ...................................... 7,066
1953 ...................................... 4,608
1954 ...................................... 2,902
1955 ...................................... 3,214
1956 ...................................... 3,475
1957 ...................................... 3,783
1958 ...................................... 3,729
1959 ...................................... 3,783
1960 ...................................... 3,440
1961 ...................................... 3,657 $255 $ 964 $4,876
1962 ...................................... 4,622 315 1,155 6,093
1963 ...................................... 4,301 275 1,087 5,663
Source: Office of Secretary of Defenje, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontrac Payments, July 1962-June 1963, p. 12; SMuALT
Busines Anuemirainoif, 1662 Am. Rzp. p. 46; General Service Administration, Procurement by Gi Lion Ezeculire Agencies, 1962 and1903 .'and Atomic Energy Commiion, Annual Reports.
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TABLE 5
PRoPoRTIoN Or- PURCHASES PLACED WITH SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS
BY FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
FISCAL YEARS 1951-1963
Dep't of NASA Other
Year Defense & AEC Agencies Total
1951 ...................................... 20.9%
1952 ...................................... 17.0%
1953 ...................................... 16.6%
1954 ...................................... 25.3%
1955 ................ ..................... 21.5%
1956 ...................................... 19.6%
1957 ...................................... 19.8%
1958 ...................................... 17.1%
1959 ..................................... . 16.69
1960 ...................................... 16:19F
1961 ...................................... 15.9% 10.7% 42.3% 17.6%
1962 ...................................... 17.7% 10.3% 49.0% 19.3%
1963 ...................................... 16.5%a 7.6% 46.6% 17.6%
Reported figure was 15.8% but is not comparable with prior years due to a change in reporting coverage. The 10.5% in this tablo Is
comparable with data reported for previous years.
Source: Department of Defense, Atomic Energy Commission, General Services Admimstration, and Sma- Businm= Administration.
The importance of the type of commodities purchased is further emphasized in
table three, in which the procurement programs of the Department of Defense are
arrayed by the size of purchases placed with small business firms. For recent years
the dollar trends of the purchases are shown in table four and the proportion placed
with small business are shown in table five. In interpreting the data for the Depart-
ment of Defense, care should be taken with 1954 and 1955 which were the lowest
dollar years but the highest percentage years. These figures reflect the termination
of hostilities in Korea when there was a sharp cutback in military procurement of
heavy equipment from large suppliers. This resulted in a correspondingly sharp
increase in the percentage of awards calculated for small business firms who did not
suffer such drastic cancellation of contracts. From the data in table five it is apparent
that the proportion of Department of Defense procurements placed with small busi-
ness firms has decreased somewhat over the past thirteen years
How should the data presented in tables one through five be interpreted and
evaluated? What are some of the contracting requirements and practices of the
federal government iwhich tend to affect favorably or adversely the small businessman
in his attempt to prticipate !in government procurement? The remainder of this
paper will try to consider some of the factors involved in these questions by discussing
the following issues:
'A trend line was calculated by the method of least squares for the data in Table 5, and its slope
indicates that the Department of Defense procurement with small business has decreased at the rate of
.38 of a percentage point per year. Part of the decline is due to a change in the mix of the programs
(missiles have gone from 5.6% in FY x956 to 24.6% in, FY 1963), and part is due to a drop of the small
business share in certain programs that are very important to small business (actions of less than $to,ooo
dropped from 66.6% in BY -1956 to 53.6% in FY 1963 and construction dropped from 71.8% in BY
1956 to 51.5% in FY 1963).
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I. The share of government procurement obtained by small business firms.
2. The method by which prime contract awards are made to small business
firms.
3. The participation of small business firms at the subcontract level as compared
to the prime contract level for government procurement.
FAIR PROPORTION
As previously noted, it is the declared policy of Congress that a "fair proportion"
of the procurement of the government be placed with small business concerns.
The statutes do not define the meaning of "fair proportion" but these words re-
peatedly appear in the regulations.5 Since one of the basic objectives of the small
business program of the government is to provide that a "fair proportion" of its
procurement is placed with small business firms, it would seem that it is essential
to evaluate the program in these termsY
The concern over "fair proportion" is evident from the letter sent by Senator John
Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, to Presi-
dent Kennedy in the fall of I963. In his letter Senator Sparkman noted with
concern that the share of small business firms in defense prime contracts awards
had declined from 17.7 per cent in fiscal year 1962 to i6.5 per cent in fiscal year 1963.
He informed the President:
As a former member of this Committee, you know of the long and continued interest of
this Committee and of the Congress to assure that small concerns have an equitable
opportunity to consider and to compete for government purchases and contracts. I am
much concerned that the declining rate of defense prime contract awards to small business
may indicate that such an opportunity is not being afforded the American small business
community.
Further emphasis to this problem was given by Mr. Irving Maness, Deputy Ad-
ministrator of the Small Business Administration, who addressed the Society of
Business Magazine Editors and stated that small business is not receiving a fair share
of government expenditures and that greater efforts are needed to help small business
obtain a fair share of government contracts."
One way to interpret the "fair proportion" policy is by examining the specific
actions taken by procurement officers. The ASPR I-7o2(b) requires that the policy
shall be implemented by "affording small business concerns an equitable opportunity
to compete for prime contracts." "Equitable opportunity" is then explained to in-
dude such specific actions as: (I) the maintenance of bidder mailing lists to include
all established and potential small business suppliers who have made applications
for inclusion; (2) invitations for bids or requests for proposals shall be sent to all
'ASPR 1-702, and 1-708; and FPR 1-1.702.
' For a discussion of the policy and administrative problems see Marcus, The "Fair Share" Debate,
x9 %VAsH. Bus. REv. 41-46 (1959).
7 Reported in the WVeekly Staff Report to the, Senate Small Business Committee, Nov. 9, 1963.8 Small Business Administration Press Release No. i5o5, Nov. 13, .963..
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firms on the appropriate list or on a pro rata basis; (3) procurement quantities shall
be divided into reasonable lots, maximum bidding time shall be allowed, and delivery
schedules shall be established on a realistic basis to encourage small business participa-
tion; and (4) applicable specifications, plans, and drawings shall be provided the
potential bidders or they shall be notified where such information can be obtained
or reviewed. The FPR contain an equivalent statement regarding "equitable op-
portunity to compete." These statements of definition, based on specific action to be
taken by procurement officers, provide guidelines for a qualitative evaluation of the
policy but lack the foundation for a quantitative evaluation.
Thus the words "fair proportion" and "equitable opportunity to compete" appear
in a number of places, but nowhere are these terms specifically defined or explained
in a manner that will permit ready quantitative evaluation. The terms are sub-
jective, and normative patterns are very difficult to obtain. Specific proposals have
been made in Congress but have not been acted upon. For example, the House
Select Committee on Small Business recommended: "A specific small-business target
of at least thirty-five per cent or more of the dollar volume of military purchases
is reasonable and attainable. 9 The justification for the thirty-five per cent recom-
mendation was not presented.
In exploring this problem with a number of small businessmen, the typical
responses received by the author have been "fair is a little more than what we are
now getting," or "if the contract is placed with me instead of my competitor, it will
be fair," or "the unfair part is all the paper work that is involved in a Government
contract" and many other similar statements that merely present a very limited point
of view.
One clue to an evaluation procedure is suggested by the statement in the Navy
Procurement Directive i-7o2, which states that a fair proportion "is considered to
be that portion which small business concerns can win in open competition when
they are given an equitable opportunity to compete .... 10
The idea of "can win in open competition" contained in the Navy Procurement
Directives suggests that one approach to the problem may be to assume that the
natural forces in the civilian sector of our economy under the free enterprise system
will automatically establish the "fair" and "equitable" portion of business that is
done with small business firms by means of the "laws of supply and demand."
If the civilian sector is accepted as a "standard" then the proportion of purchases
and contracts placed with small business firms by government procurement programs
can be compared to this standard. If the proportion of government procurement
from small business firms is equal to or greater than the proportion established in
*House Comm. on Small Business, Review of Small Business, H.R. REp. No. 2513, 82d Cong., ad
Sess. 2, 176-77 (1952).
'0 (Emphasis added.) The military departments within the Department of Defense issued supplemental
instructions implementing the ASPR. These include the Navy Procurement Directives (NPD), the Army
Procurement Procedures (APP), the Air Force Procurement Instructions (AFPI), and the Defense Supply
Procurement Regulations (DSPR).
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the civilian sector of the economy, then there may be a presumption that small
business is obtaining its fair proportion or more. If the government procurement
from small business firms is less than the civilian proportion, then there may be a
presumption that small business is not getting its fair proportion. The problem now
becomes one of locating the proper statistics for comparison and analysis.
A number of governmental agencies collect and publish statistical data about
industry, its employment, sales, profits, size of firms, and so forth. The classifications
used by the various agencies often differ from one another and normally the statistics
do not differentiate between "small" business and "large" business. The statute1
provides that "a small business concern shall be deemed to be one which is inde-
pendently owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation."
In addition the Administrator of the SBA is authorized to establish detailed defini-
tions using such criteria as number of employees and dollar volume of business.
In general, firms that employ not more than 500 employees are considered to be
small businesses.
There are many exceptions, however, to the 500 employee rule. Certain industries
have 750 or x,ooo employees designated as the dividing point. Small business firms
in the construction industries must have annual sales that do not exceed $7,500,000.
In the petroleum industry small firms must not have more than 30,000 barrels per
day crude oil capacity. For trucking or warehousing operations the annual receipts
must not exceed $3,000,000. There are other special definitions that complicate the
problems of determining what is a small business. The Census of Manufacturers
collects data by size of establishments every five years; and a first approximation
can be made by classifying the statistics for those establishments with less than 500
employees as compared to those with 500 or more employees. This is a rough approx-
imation because of the exceptions to the 500 employee rule, but it is a starting point.
This data is shown in table six. Unfortunately, the Census of Manufacturers does
not report "value of shipments" for major industrial groups which would be more
TABLE 6
MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS BY EMPLOYMENT SIZE: 1958
Establishments Establishments
All with Less Than with 500 or
Establishments 500 Employees More Employees
Number of Establishments 298,182 293,564 4,618
100.0% 98.5% 1.5%
Total Employment (1,000) 15,394 8,806 6,588
100.0% 57.3% 42.7%
Value Added by
Manufacture ($1,000,000) 141,270 72,780 68,490
100.0% 51.5% 48.5%
Source: U. S. DEP'T of CoN'acP, 1958 CENsus OF MANUFACTURES, vol. 1, pt. 2. table 1, at 2-2.
12 72 Stat. 384 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1963).
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desirable to evaluate "fair proportion" than the data reported of employment or "value
added by manufacture."
A greater fault of the Census of Manufacturers data for the purpose herein is
that it is reported on an "establishment" basis12 A significant number of the estab-
lishments, however, are listed as part of multi-unit companies, as shown in table
seven. Thus, many establishments shown as having less than 500 employees are
TABLE 7
MANUFACTUiRING ESTABLISHMENTS BY TYPE OF OPERATIoN: 1958
Establishments Establishments
All in Single Unit in Multiunit
Establishments Companies Companies
Number of Establishments 298,182 256,311 41,871
100.0% 86.0% 14.0%
Total Employment (1,000) 15,394 5,317 10,077
34.6% 65.4%
Value Added by 141,270 37,853 103,417
Manufacture ($1,000,000) 100.0% 26.8% 73.2%
Source: U.S. DnP'T or Comexni, 1958 CEosus or MIeuscrvPcS, vol. L pt. 3, table 1, at 3-2.
really part of larger organizations and should be classified as large rather than
small business. The use of establishments as the dividing criterion in table six
overstates the proportion assigned to small business firms. In spite of this deficiency,
however, it is interesting to note from table six the proportion for establishments
with less than 500 employees for total employment of 57.3 per cent and for the
value added by such manufacturers of 51.5 per cent roughly corresponds to the 46.6
per cent of purchases from small business by government agencies other than the
Department of Defense (DOD), National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), as shown in table one. If
establishments in single unit companies, as shown in table seven, are used as the
basis of comparison, then the small business share drops to 34.6 per cent based on
total employment and to only 26.8 per cent based on the value added by small
manufacturers. It is difficult to determine whether such an assumption overstates
or understates the situation since small and large business firms are undoubtedly
included in each category.
In addition to the "establishment" difficulty, another problem confounds the
proper interpretation of the proportion statistics. As shown in table three there are
significant differences in the character of various government procurement pro-
grams, especially those of the Department of Defense, as compared to civilian
procurement activities. Thus, while military purchases include almost every kind
'" A company operating establishments at more than one location is counted separately at each locatiorf.
In addition, if a company is engaged in distinctly different lines of activity at one location and the
activities are substantial in size, then each activity is counted as a separate establishment.
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of item that is used in the civilian sector, they also involve many items not in the
civilian sector, particularly those of a highly technical nature. This suggests that
it is desirable to classify the procurement by industrial groups or commodity classes
in order to observe the statistical differences between comparable commodities.
Normally the industrial statistics collected by the various government agencies are
reported in accordance with the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)."1 The
various procurement agencies, however, do not report their statistics by SIC groups,
but rather by procurement programs, as shown in table three. It is possible, however,
to match up approximately certain SIC groups with elected procurement programs.
This was done by Peck and Scherer for selected military procurement programs for
fiscal year x959, as compared with the SIC groups, using percentage of employees in
establishments with less than 5oo employees for 1955 from the Census of Manufac-
turers data. 4 In spite of the problem of over-statement of small business proportion
by use of "establishments," these authors concluded, "there is the same rough
correspondence . . . between the percentage of small business in an industry and
its share of the comparable military procurement."
Thus, the Census of Manufacturers data is difficult to use for the purpose of
evaluating the small business fair share: "establishments" do not permit the proper
identification of firms which are small business, the SIC code used does not match the
procurement programs, and finally the detailed data is only collected for every fifth
year and is not available until several years after the census year.
The author has attempted to circumvent the deficiencies encountered from using
Census of Manufacturers "establishments" by means of a mathematical expedient
applied to other data. Annual data is available for business receipts of major in-
dustrial groups based on income tax returns classified by size of receipts and form
of organizations. 5  Anual data is also available for employment by various SIC
groups classified by employment size of establishments.10 By combining the data
on business receipts and employment as described in the following paragraph it is
believed that a very close approximation can be obtained of the true small business
share of the civilian market by major industrial groups. Table eight illustrates the
method of analysis for Textile Mill Products, SIC Group 22.
For each major industry the employment situation was determined from the
Department of Labor data for March i96o, as shown in section A of table eight.
Total business receipts by SIC major industry groups were determined from the
"'U.S. OFFICE OF STATISTICAL STANDARDS, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXEcUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATON MANUAL (1957).
" See Small Business Share by Program and Percentage of Employees in Small Business Firms for
Corresponding Industries, in MERTON J. PECK & FREDERICK M. SCHEREn, THE WEAPON ACQusSITIoN
PRoCESS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS table 5.i6, at 145 (1962).
'U.S. TREAs. DP'T, INT. REv. SuRv., STATISTICS OF INCOME, 1960-6I: U.S. BusINESS TAx RmuRs
(x963).
"' U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES BY INDUSTRY
AND STATE, STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO LABOR MA ET AND ELLOYmENT SECURITY (published in the
first quarter of each year).
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TABLE 8
SMALL BusinEss PROPORTION FOR TXTILE MILL PRoDucs-SIC Gnou, 2z
A. Manufacturing Employment, March 1960:a Employees %
In establishments employing 500 or less 489,876 52.5
In establishments employing over 500 443,374 47.5
Total 933,250 100.0
B. Business Receipts:b
Sole proprietorships $ 67,749,000
Active partnerships 246,140,000
Active corporations 13,592,873,000
Total $13,906,762,000
$13,906,762,000
C. Business receipts per employee (B- -A) ... $ 614,900
933,250
D. Business receipts for a small business firm of 500 employees (C X 500) = $14,900 X 500=
$7,450,000
E. Classified Business Receiptsb (In million dollars): Small Large All
Business Business Business
Firms Firms Firms
Sole proprietorships $ 68 $ 68
Active partnerships 246 246
Active corporations by size of business receipts:
Under $5 4,004 4,004
35-10 786o $ 819 1,605
Over $10 7,983 7,983
Corporation Total 4,790 8,802 13,592
Grand Total $5,104 8 8,802 $13,906
F. Proportion 36.6% 63.4% 100.0%
Source: U.S. DEP'T or LABOn, BuREAu or EmroPnmm Srunr, ErLOYMEwr AND WAGEs BT INntS'Y AND STATr, STATIG-TICAL SPPLEMENT TO LABOR MARssT AND EMPLOYEST SECURITr (First Quarter 1960 total on p. 20; enployec3 by sizs category cal.
culated from data on p. 98).b U.S. "TAusuar DP's, I s rmL nvEum SuavicE. STAszrncs oF Incoun ,1980-61: U.S. Busumms TAx RrTnas 22 54, and 91.
(7.45-5)
Small= 1605 X - =786
(10-5)
(10-7.45)
Large=1605 X =819(10-5)
U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service data for organizations with
accounting periods that ended between July i96o and June 1961 as shown in section
B of table eight. Dividing the business receipts by total employment gave a figure
for business receipts per employee as shown in section C of table eight. This figure
was then multiplied by the number of employees specified by the SBA regulations
for the appropriate small business category to determine the dividing point between
small and large firms based on business receipts, as shown in section D of table eight.
This dividing point value was then referred to the Internal Revenue Service tables
showing business receipts (by size of firm in terms of business receipts); and the
data for each class by size was then separated into the small or large firm category,
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using the dividing benchmark as shown in section E of table eight. In the case
of the class size into which the benchmark figure fell, the business receipts for that
class were mathematically prorated between large and small firms. From the total
values accumulated for each category, proportions were then determined between
small and large business firms as shown in section F of table eight. These figures
were then paired with comparable procurement programs as shown in table nine.
The military program for Textiles, Clothing and Equipage, showing small
TABLE 9
SMALL BusINEss SHARE BY SELECTED MILITARY PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS AND PERCENTAGE OF
BUSINESS RECEIPTS OF SMALL BUSINESS FIRiVMS FOR CORRESPONDING INDUSTRIES
Small Business Percentage
of Military Procurement
by Program (FY 1961)
Textiles, Clothing & Equipage
Subsistence
Construction
Military Building Supplies
Tank-Automotive:
Combat Vehicles
Non-Combat Vehicles
Transportation Equipment
Aircraft:
Airframes
Aircraft engines
Other Aircraft Equipment and Supplies
Ships
Fuels and Lubricants
Medical & Dental Supplies & Equipment
Photographic Equipment & Supplies
Electronic & Communications Equipment
Percentage of Business Receipts
of Business Firms Employing
less than 500 for Accounting Periods
ending July 1960-June 1961
fTextile Mill Products
55.9% Apparel
(Leather
Combined
55.8% Food and Kindred Products
'General Building Contractors
[Highway, Steel & Heavy
53.6% Construction
Specialty Trade Contractors
(Total Construction
53.0% Lumber & Wood Products
9.2% Motor Vehicles and Equipment
11.6%
30.1%
1.2% -Transportation Equipment except
2.3% Motor Vehicles
10.8%
8.6%
24.3% Petroleum Refining & Related
Industries
30.2%Instruments & Related Products46.4%E
8.3% Electrical Machinery Equipment
Source: Military procurement ratios from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Milifary Prime Contract. Aards and Subcorrad Payments
July 1960-June 1961, P. 20. Business receipts ratios calculated by author-see table eight and supporting text.
business procurement of 55.9 per cent, is roughly comparable to the SIC Group 22
for Textile Mill Products, Group 23 for Apparel, and Group 31 for Leather and
Leather Products, which combined show 54.7 per cent of business receipts generated
by small business firms. In a similar manner the military item Subsistence is
roughly comparable to the SIC group Food and Kindred Products. In this pairing,
36.6%
71.1%
59.5%
54.7%
37.8%
80.9%
55.3%
93.0%
82.2%
73.4%
6.0%
10.0%
2.1%
25.2%
22.3%
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however, the military subsistence proportion placed with small business of 55.8 per
cent is substantially higher than the business receipts proportion of small business firms
for Food and Kindred Products of 37.8 per cent. On the other hand, military procure-
ment from small business of Electronic Communications Equipment amounted
to 8.3 per cent, as compared with 22.3 per cent for business receipts of small business
firms in the Electrical Machinery, Equipment and Supplies Industry. An exami-
nation of the various proportions for the military items with the corresponding in-
dustry groups indicates that about half of the pairs show a higher percentage for
military procurement than for business receipts, and about half show a lower per-
centage, for military procurement than for business receipts.
An analysis was made for all manufacturing industries, similar to the method
presented in table eight; and it showed that small business firms obtained 32.2 per
cent of total business receipts in i96o-6i, and large business firms obtained 67.8 per
cent. The 32.2 per cent calculated by this method should be compared to the pro-
curement proportions shown in table one. The Department of Defense situation
must be examined in depth by programs as previously shown in table nine. Because
of the nature of the commodities that it purchases, NASA procurement must be
similarly analyzed; but the data was not available to do so for this report. The very
low small business proportion of 32 per cent for the AEC is not comparable because
a major part of AEC procurement is for the construction and operation of large-scale
facilities, generally requiring the services of firms far larger than small business
firms. For the other executive agencies it would appear, in general, that the federal
procurement programs have provided small business firms with at least a fair pro-
portion of the awards. It may even be argued by some that small business firms have
received more than their fair proportion, and that large business firms are being
unfairly discriminated against.
The interpretation that small business firms are receiving their fair proportion, or
more, of government purchases, if proven true, should not be an unexpected surprise.
After all, the basic policy favoring small business, and the specific and significant
programs that have been developed to assist small business provides important ad-
vantages to such firms. This advantage is probably gained at the expense of slightly
larger firms, say up to 2,ooo or 3,ooo employees, rather than from the very large firms.
The question of social justification, however, in shifting business and employment
from a group of larger firms to a group of smaller firms is beyond the scope of this
paper. It may be noted, however, that the successful small firms who grow beyond
5oo employees and become large firms lose the advantage of their former small size.
Thus, in this respect, their success becomes a penalty.
An implicit assumption behind the small business programs is that buyers and
procurement officers tend to be prejudiced against small business firms and more
favorable to placing orders with large business firms. It is not clear whether such
an assumption is based on the effect of reciprocity, interlocking corporate director-
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ships, unfair competitive practices, price, quality or services. It is the author's
opinion, based on his experience as a small business manufacturer and from his
research, that the opposite situation is more often the case. Buyers and procurement
officers tend to prefer to place orders with small rather than large business firms,
other factors being equal, because small businessmen are often more cooperative,
easier to deal with, and will allow the buyer greater access to information regarding
their operations.
The mathematical expedient used to calculate the small business share from
business receipts as shown in table eight, is substantially more accurate than the
use of "establishments"; but it still leaves much to be desired as far as analytical
procedure is concerned. A better method, however, requires changes in the manner
in which statistical data is collected. It would be very helpful if the procurement
agencies could classify their purchases by the SIC group of their suppliers. Because
of the increasing complications and variation in the size standard for various in-
dustrial groups to distinguish between small and large business firms, it also would
be desirable if the income tax returns could indicate whether each company is
classified as a small or a large business firm. It would be particularly useful if
this were also applied to the io,ooo firms in the sample used by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Securities & Exchange Commission as the basis of their quarterly
data reported in the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations.
If this were done it would permit reasonably current comparisons to be made directly
between the government procurement actions and the total competitive markets, and
thus provide a more reasonable answer to the question of what is a "fair proportion."
VENDOR SELECTION BY ADVERTISED vERsus NEGOTIATED METHODS
A basic objective of government procurement policy for over 150 years has been
to give all potential suppliers a reasonable opportunity to compete for government
awards. The first federal statute regarding this matter was passed in 18o9 and
provided that ". . . all purchases and contracts for supplies or services which are or
may, according to law, be made by or under the direction of either the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Secretary of War, or the Secretary of the Navy, shall be made
either by open purchase, or by previously advertising for proposals respecting the
same .... "17
The choice between "open purchases" or "advertising for proposals" was inter-
preted by the Attorney General to mean that advertising was required in all cases
except where public exigencies necessitated immediate contract performance. In
such a case the procurement would be "negotiated" in the open market in a manner
similar to that for ordinary commercial transactions.
Following this statute many laws were passed specifying in increasing detail the
precise manner by which procurement by advertising would be carried out. Con-
current with the increasing regulations regarding the use of advertising for obtaining
" Act of March 3, 1809, § 5, 2 Stat. 535-36.
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bids there developed a number of exceptions which provided for negotiation of
contracts when such methods better served the government's purpose. The philosophy
of using advertised bidding methods as the normal way of procuring government
goods and services and using negotiated bidding methods as the exceptional way of
procuring government goods and services has continued to this day for peacetime
conditions.
It is interesting to note, however, that during wartime conditions the historic
restrictions on procurement methods have inevitably been removed. Thus, the
First War Powers Act of X941"8 permitted the abandonment of advertising procedures
during the national emergency and provided for procurement by negotiation. In
spite of this, many procurement officers persisted in the use of advertised bidding
(perhaps because it provided protection from the criticisms and investigations that
were painful memories from World War I). It was necessary for the War Produc-
tion Board to issue Directive No. 2 on March 3, 1942, directing that procurement
by advertising be abandoned, and requiring contracts to be awarded by negotiation.
After World War II, President Truman, upon signing the Armed Services
Procurement Act on February 19, 1948,19 wrote to the Secretary of Defense linking
small business and bidding methods. His letter, in part, stated:
20
This bill grants unprecedented freedom from specific procurement restrictions during
peacetime. That freedom is given to permit the flexibility and latitude needed in present
day national defense activities. The basic need, however, remains to assure favorable price
and adequate service to the Government. To the degree that restrictions have been di-
minished, therefore, responsibility upon the Defense Establishment has been increased.
There is danger that the natural desire for flexibility and speed in procurement will lead
to excessive placement of contracts by negotiation and undue reliance upon large concerns,
and this must not occur.
The ASPR provides in section two that all goods and services shall be procured
by advertised bidding except that negotiation may be permitted under the specific
condition outlined in section three. A recent modification (November 15, 1963) to
the ASPR 2-102. (a) now tightens the exceptions and provides that formal adver-
tising shall be used whenever feasible and practicable, even though conditions satisfy
section three of ASPR which lists these seventeen situations where negotiated bidding
is permitted:
i. National emergency
2. Public exigency
3- Purchases not more than $2,5oo
4. Personal or professional services
5. Services of educational institutions
6. Purchases outside the United States
is 55 Stat. 838 (1941), 50 U.S.C. App. § 6oi (1958).
1 "Act of Feb. 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 21.
20 Reported in Case Notes prepared for the Aircraft Industry Purchasing Course, by Harbridge House,
Inc., Boston, 1952.
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7- Medicines or medical supplies
8. Supplies purchased for authorized resale
9. Perishable or nonperishable subsistence supplies
io. Impracticable to secure competition by formal advertising
ii. Experimental, developmental or research work
2. Classified products
13. Technical equipment requiring standardization and interchangeability of parts
14. Substantial initial investment or extended periods of manufacture
15. Negotiation after advertising
i6. National defense or industrial mobilization
17. Otherwise authorized by law
Similar provisions are contained in the Federal Procurement Regulations and the
regulations for other agencies.
What has been the impact on the welfare of small business firms of the basic
government policy favoring advertised bidding methods over negotiated bidding
methods? It should be noted that the formal advertised bidding method is almost
nonexistent in the commercial business world, even though the federal government
has used the procedure for over i5o years. Many voices, including those of the
Small Business Administration and the Attorney General, purporting to protect
and advance the position of small business firms, have strongly advocated further
extensive use of advertised bidding and a reduction in the use of negotiated bidding.
Others have taken the opposite point of view.2'
" See Carl G. Hokenson and others, of the Military Procurement Advisory Committee, to Senator
George A. Smathers, How TO IMPROVE FEDERAL PROCEDURES FOR BUYING NATIONAL DEFENSE MATERIALS
c. I, "Advertised versus Negotiated Procurement" (Aug. 18, I96I). This committee of seven authorities
from both large and small companies and government agencies was appointed to study certain problem
areas in the Department of Defense purchasing system. They, in turn, called on a large number of
associates to study the problems in depth, and expended more than 5o,ooo man-hours in compiling the
report. Their recommendations included the following statement:
"In light of the significant position of negotiated procurement as the most appropriate method for
expenditure of the greater portion of our defense funds, it is recommended that the statute be modified to
eliminate the preference for advertising over negotiation and that the ASPR be modified correspondingly
to permit the military department to exercise its judgment in selecting the type of procurement which best
satisfies the specific conditions for each proposed contract.
'In areas of both advertised and negotiated procurement, it is recommended that greater emphasis
be placed upon all of the major procurement factors including quality, delivery, and technical advances
rather than the lowest bid price alone.
"While it is the Committee's judgment that formally advertised procurements should, by statute and
by regulation, have equal stature with negotiated procurement that involves some form of effective competi-
tion, the Committee believes that single or sole source procurements should be treated separately both in
the statutes and regulations, and should, as a precautionary measure against misuse, continue to require
justification. Tide io, section 2304, of the United States Code dealing with this matter should be
amended to delete from the seventeen exceptions those which presently apply to competitive negotiation
and to include only those justifications deemed necessary when single or sole source procurement is
utilized by the military departments. The Code should be amended, furthermore, to clearly define
three methods of procurement: namely, formal advertising, competitive negotiation, and single or sole
source procurement, the latter requiring careful justification. The Committee believes that if competitive
negotiation were released from the requirement of justification as an exception, the tendency would be for
the military departments to exact fuller explanation from Contracting Officers for single or sole source
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In order to determine what small businessmen themselves thought about the
procedure, the author and others undertook in i96o a survey believed to be the
first definitive study of this problem 2
A questionnaire was sent to a carefully selected group of 5,014 manufacturers
located throughout the United States. Responses from 1,165 small business firms
formed the basis of the study. Although they varied in size from the smallest to the
largest permitted under the small business size classification, the median-sized
company employed fifty-two workers. Total annual sales for the companies
amounted to $I,657,775,ooo, with the median company having sales of approximately
three quarters of a million dollars per year. Most of the firms were in the "hard
goods" industries (none were in food or tobacco products). Table ten is a break-
TABLE io
SALES BY RESPONDENTS
(University of Washington Survey)
Sales to Government Agencies:
Department of Defense $148,265,000
Other 43,569,750
$ 191,834,750
Sales to Business Firms as a Subcontractor for Defense Programs 569,707,500
Commercial Non-defense 705,940,000 1,275,647,500
1,467,482,250Sales not Classified 100,292,760
$1,657,775,000
Source: ALrRT N. SCmH=BER, SUMNRs M&RCUS, ROBERr A. Surmnurznr & EDWAnD G. BnowN, DEFENsm P,,ocuWnhnrT AND
SMrsA BusmEss table 57, at 76 (1961).
down of their sales. These firms sold almost $200 million worth of goods and
services to the federal government (about three-fourths to defense agencies, one-
fourth to other agencies-a proportion that was almost identical to the proportions
shown in table one) and in their remaining sales to business firms $570 million
involved subcontracts on defense programs. These figures are cited merely to indi-
cate that the respondents to the survey represented a large and responsible group of
companies who had experience with both government and commercial procurement
procedures.
The respondents were asked, "How do you generally prefer to sell your products
or services? (Assume your competitors have the same opportunity)." The response
of those who indicated a preference is shown in table eleven.
A recent survey of small businesses in research and development industries in
Maryland and metropolitan Washington, D.C. asked exactly the same question and
actions which should be the subject of such attention. In short, the emphasis would be placed where
it belongs."
" ALBERT N. SCHRIEBER, SUMINER MARcus, ROBERT A. SUTEMEISTER & EDWARD G. BROWN, D sENsE
PROCURE1MENT AND SMALL BUSINESS (I96I).
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TABLE ii
CHOICE OF BIDDING METHODS FOR RESPONDENT'S OWN PRODUCTS'
(University of Washington Survey)
Number of
Firms %
Advertised Bidding .......................................... 89 8.2
Negotiated Bidding ............................................... 711 65.7
Sole Source Bidding .............................................. 151 13.9
No Preference ................................................... 132 12.2
1,083 100.0
Not Answered .............................................. 82
1,165
11n response to the question: "How do you generally prefer to sell your products or services? (Assume your competitiors have the same
opportunity)."
Source: .mcmIneoe, [Aecus, SumceRceisvTc & BROWN, Op. Cit. aupra table 10, at table 104, p 105.
obtained the response shown in table twelve. This study was made under a grant
from the Small Business Administration. From these studies it is apparent that there
is a serious dichotomy between views of the practicing small businessmen and the
views of those who claim to be their spokesmen. The basic government policy is to
emphasize advertised bidding; the overwhelming preference of small business is for
negotiated bidding.
TABLE 12
CHOICE OF BIDDING METHODS FOR RESPONDENT'S OWN PRODUCTSt
(University of Maryland Survey)
Number of
Firms %
Advertised Bidding .......................................... 1 1.7
Negotiated Bidding ............................................... 18 31.6
Sole Source Bidding ......................................... 31 54.4
No Preference ................................................... 7 12.3
57 100.0Not answered ............................................... 16
73
t In response to the question: "How do you generally prefer to sell your products or services? (Assume your competitors have the same
oppor tunity)."
Source: SPsEcrn M. Smm & MICHAE. B CAnTrs, PrwonmAx am PorTNsvAL or SeAm. Busss n; RsEAnca AND DnvrsopWosr
Ismousrms, table C-20, at 41.
An analysis of the detailed responses from the various companies in the University
of Washington study suggests the following possible reasons for the small business
preference for negotiated bidding:
I. Negotiated bidding is more profitable to the supplier.
a. The cost of preparing bids for negotiated contracts is believed to be less
than for advertised contracts in relation to profits, as shown in table thirteen.
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TABLE 13
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COST OF PREPARING BIDS FOR DEFENSE BUSINESS
AND BIDDING METHOD EMPLOYED
Advertised Bidding Negotiated Bidding
Prime Sub- Prime Sub-
Cost of preparing bids Contracts Contracts Contracts Contracts
compared to profit
on awards received Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
of Firms of Firms of Firms of Firms
Excessive .................................... 61.2% 43.2% 42.2% 27.5%
Reasonable .................................. 31.4 50.1 51.9 65.9
Low ........................................ 7.4 6.7 5.9 6.6
Total .................................... 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: ScmEc, Msscus. SuTr.sISrAs & BnOWN, ep. ci. upra table 10, at table 23, p. 30.
b. The profits on negotiated contracts are believed to be higher than on
advertised contracts, as shown in table fourteen.
TABLE 14
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROFITS ON BUSINESS AND TYPE OF CONTRACT
Advertised Bidding Negotiated Bidding
Prime Sub- Prime Sub-
Contracts Contracts Contracts Contracts
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
of Firms of Firms of Firms of Firms
Higher ...................................... 2.6% 2.5% 3.9% 5.5%
Same ....................................... 27.1 44.2 42.4 56.9
Lower ...................................... 57.7 48.5 49.2 35.7
Loss ........................................ 12.6 4.8 4.5 1.9
ToWd ..................................... 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: SCHamBER, MARCUS, SUarsIs'rR, BROWN, op. cit supra table 10, at table 24, p. 31.
c. It is believed that there is a greater likelihood of securing a contract after
negotiated bidding than after advertised bidding, as shown in table fifteen.
TABLE 15
PERCENTAGE OF TIME RESPONDENTS WERE SUCCESSFUL IN GETrING AN
AWARD By TYPE op BIDDING
Prime Contractors Sub-Contracts
Advertised bidding .................................. 13.7% 19.6%
Negotiated bidding .................................. 27.4% 43.0%
Source: ScasiBER, MiAcus, Su-rmmmcrH, Bnowz, op. cit. supra table 10, at table 26, p. 32.
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d. The respondents are of the opinion that the risks of the supplier in con-
tracts awarded under negotiated bidding are likely to be less than in those
awarded under advertised bidding.
2. Negotiated bidding affords greater protection to the proprietary information
of the creative supplier. The pressure to get specifications for advertised
bidding leads military agencies to demand excessive design information from
originators of privately developed products and tends to reduce incentive for
private development.
3. The buyer is more likely to get the product he wants more economically under
the negotiated bidding system than under the advertised bidding system.
a. There is greater danger in advertised than in negotiated bidding that an
irresponsible or unsophisticated supplier will be awarded the contract.
b. The buyer will get a better product at a lower cost under competitive negoti-
ated contract procedure than under any other method.
c. Negotiated bidding permits the buyer to eliminate contingency from the
price in cases where advertised bidding does not permit this.
d. Advertised bidding impedes new developments because it requires freezing
of design in order to prepare the specifications that are necessary for ad-
vertised bidding.
4. Negotiated bidding favors neither large nor small suppliers.
5. The respondents indicated that they favored the-method of bidding with which
they were most familiar.
One of the methods by which small business is favored is provided by the set-aside
program, under which the procuring agency designates a specific procurement that
must be awarded to small business. Usually such programs are offered to small
business firms on an advertised bidding procedure. In fiscal year 1963 the Defense
Department reported that under the small business and labor surplus area set-aside
programs it had placed awards totaling almost one and a half billion dollars.
Other agencies are estimated to have placed awards under the small business set-side
program amounting to about one quarter billion dollars. Undoubtedly the set-side
program has resulted in some awards being made to small businesses that might
otherwise have gone to larger companies who could have bid a lower price or
provided a more advantageous contract for the government. The Small Business
Administration and others have attached particular importance to the set-side
program and have pushed it very hard. The set-aside program, however, does have
its dangers as is illustrated in the following case.
Tim CASE OF THm PROMOm ADvERTisx Bm
An example of the conditions that can result from the extreme promotion of
advertised bidding is the following situation which took place a few years ago in
one of the military services. The description of the situation relies on the memory
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of the civilian procurement officer involved on a "recall" basis, and includes some
rough estimates; hence the specific numbers may not be completely accurate. Even
if the situation is treated as hypothetical, however, it does present the order of
magnitude of the problem from several points of view-those of the suppliers, the
procurement agency, and the person gauging overall social costs. This incident also
illustrates an area that needs a great deal of additional objective research to describe
and document the spectrum of situations that can occur under various bidding
methods. Such research can lead to better analysis of alternatives which, in turn,
may suggest improved optimum, rather than suboptimum, solutions.
Prior to 1954 a small manufacturer developed a special electronic amplifier for
military use. Although there were several standard catalog items available that
were similar to the required device, special military requirements regarding quality,
environmental conditions, and functional performance necessitated a new design.
The design showed promise, and a development contract on a cost-plus basis for
a few units was negotiated between the manufacturer and a military agency. This
contract was successfully completed, and was followed by several additional pro-
duction contracts totaling a few thousand units-which led to the stabilization of the
design and provided the contracting officer with complete cost information (costs
had progressively declined in close accordance with "improvement curve theory").3
The price of the unit had been reduced to $235, based on audited costs of about $215
per unit (production performance was considered to be reasonably efficient) and
profit of $20 per unit.
Additional requirements later developed within the military service involved, so
that action was taken to procure 5,000 more units. By this time the design char-
acteristics had been fixed; and, based on data supplied by the manufacturer, the
procurement agency had a complete set of both design and production drawings.
The technology of the job required some skills, but not at an unusually high level for
many manufacturers of electro-mechanical devices. At a conference held between
representatives of the Small Business Administration and the procurement officer of
the military agency, it was agreed that this project was an ideal one for small business
and that there was sufficient lead time to use standard procurement procedures. As
a result, it was classified as falling under the set-aside program of the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation.
Copies of the invitations to bid and appropriate drawings and specifications were
" Improvement or "learning" curve theory suggests that costs in manufacturing operations reduce
at a constant rate as quantities are doubled. Thus, if the costs of the ioth unit are 8o% of those of the
5 th unit, then the sooth unit will cost 8o% of that for the 5oth unit, and so on. This theory suggests
that those firms which get into production on a given item ahead of their competitors will move down
the improvement curve and have a distinct cost advantage in future competitions. If this theory is true,
then the original manufacturer reported in this situation, merely by virtue of his head start on a pro.
duction program, should have had a distinct cost advantage over his competitors of equivalent average
productive efficiency. Significant underbidding of the original manufacturer's quotation by others could,
therefore, possibly be considered unusual and justify the need for an explanation of the relative quotations.
See Hirschmann, Profit from the Learning Curue, 42 HAx.v. Bus. REv. 125 (1964).
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fanned out to all the Small Business Administration offices and procurement offices
of the military service involved. Representatives of each local Small Business Admin-
istration office called on those manufacturers in their area who they thought could
do a satisfactory job.
The procurement was also advertised in the Department of Commerce Daily,
which is a synopsis of United States government proposed procurements, sales, and
contract awards. It is estimated that approximately 8oo potential firms were alerted
to the proposed procurement and received specifications and drawings. In order to
avoid favoritism, special inquiries received from some firms for specific or additional
information were referred back to the standard specification and design drawings
that had been distributed.
This activity in publicizing the procurement resulted in two hundred manufac-
turers submitting bids that ranged from a low of $iio per unit to a high of over
$9oo per unit. Approximately one third of the bids submitted were below the $235
price of the previous procurement. The original source bid $225 per unit.
The large number of bids and their wide range posed a serious dilemma for the
procurement officer. Why were so many bids significantly lower than that of the
previous supplier, whose costs had been carefully audited and were definitely known
to be reasonable? Possible explanations of this dilemma were:
i. Some manufacturers had special competence that permitted them to bid sub-
stantially lower than the bid of the original source.
2. Some companies might be "buying" the business by bidding lower than their
expected costs, but expecting to make up the losses by price adjustments for
"changes" or from future follow-on contracts that they might obtain when their costs
were at a lower point on the "improvement curve."
3. Some bidders might have been inexperienced in the work involved and pre-
pared their bid in error.
4. Some bidders might have had inadequate cost data and erroneously estimated
their costs too low.
Because of the fixed-price type of contract to be used in this situation, it would
be impossible and, of course, undesirable to "bail out" any supplier who received
the contract and subsequently discovered that he had bid too low on the work in-
volved. As a result it was decided that each bidder had to demonstrate complete
financial responsibility to handle the contract even though he lost money on the
program.
It was therefore decided to classify as an irresponsible bidder those whose net
worth was less than the difference between the $235 price per unit of the previous
procurement and their specific bid price. On the basis of this restriction the
fourteen lowest bidders, in an array of bidders by price, were stricken as being
financially irresponsible because of limited net worth. The fifteenth lowest bidder
had a net worth that was slightly above the potential loss based on the difference
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between his bid price of $i95 and $235 per unit. An award was made to this bidder
and to three others at slightly higher prices to avoid placing undue reliance on a
single source.
One of the four suppliers experienced production troubles and required technical
assistance from the military service. All four suppliers, however, eventually com-
pleted their contract. Because of the use of fixed-price contracts, the procurement
officer could not accurately obtain the cost experience of the suppliers, but he doubted
whether any made a profit and he suspected several had serious losses.
The final contract prices averaged $200 per unit for the five thousand units,
so that about $ioooooo was bid for the total procurement program. It was estimated
that the solicitation costs by the military service and the Small Business Administra-
tion for drawings, specifications, and personnel time amounted to at least $xo per
manufacturer contacted, resulting in a total expenditure of $8,ooo for the eight
hundred potential suppliers. Those who did not submit a bid were estimated to have
spent approximately $50 in studying the plans and deciding not to bid. This involved
six hundred suppliers who thus spent $30,000 in total, but who did not participate.
The two hundred firms that submitted bids were estimated to have spent approxi-
mately $iooo each in studying the plans and specifications, obtaining material prices,
estimating the production operations and the costs involved thereto. Thus it appears
that $200,ooo was spent by those who submitted bids.
The original supplier submitted a bid of $225 per unit which would have
resulted in a total price of $i,i25,ooo. This was $i25,0oo higher than the bids of the
companies that actually received the award. The actual manufacturers, however,
are believed to have had costs exceeding their prices and thus sustained losses of at
least $250,000. In addition, because their facilities were committed on this contract,
they were forced to refuse some other business with which they were familiar and
on which they were likely to have made a profit.
With two hundred bidders and only four awards involved in this action it is
evident that each bidder had a probability of success of only two per cent. Many of
the bidders inferred, because they had been solicited by the Small Business Admin-
istration to participate in the program, that the government wanted them and that
they were almost certain to get the contract. It is highly questionable whether very
many would have submitted bids if they had known the previous prices charged by
the original supplier and the number of bidders who had been invited to participate
in the new procurement.
The original sole source supplier would have provided a completely satisfactory
product for $i,i25,ooo. The advertised bidding procedure gave a great many firms
the opportunity to participate in the competition, but the total "social cost '24
24
Cost of promoting invitation for bids: Sio X 800 $ 8,000
Cost of examining invitation by those who did not bid: $5o x 6oo 3o,ooo
Costs of preparing bids by those who competed: $i,ooo x 2oo 200,000
Cost of production by manufacturers receiving awards:
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amounted to $i,488,ooo and resulted in suppliers who sustained losses and were
diverted from producing for other customers, and in many disgruntled firms who
had failed to receive a contract.
The author does not want to suggest on the basis of the previous data' comments,
and example that advertised bidding methods are completely undesirable for the
small businessman. On the contrary, there are circumstances where advertised
bidding is a preferred method.
The point being made, however, is that government procurement procedures
should not be unduly biased in favor of advertised bidding methods and against
negotiated bidding methods. The preference should be made between "competitive"
and "noncompetitive" methods. This would suggest that the procurement regula-
tions could be rewritten to emphasize competition and describe more carefully the
various circumstances in which different methods are to be preferred: formal ad-
vertised methods, two-step advertised procedures, and competitive negotiations. Sole
source procurement would then be separated from competitive negotiated procure-
ment and be given the special attention and restrictions that this procedure requires.
Historical data showing the success of small business firms in obtaining awards from
the Department of Defense by advertised, as compared with negotiated, procurement
methods is contained in tables sixteen through nineteen that accompany the following
discussion of subcontracting.
PuME CoNnucrs vs. SUBCONTRACTS
A final topic for discussion is to give recognition to the relative importance of sub-
contracts obtained by small business firms from larger business firms who have
obtained prime contracts from the government.
The Department of Defense has a mandatory subcontracting program with all
of its prime contractors and subcontractors who obtain total contracts of $5ooooo or
more with substantial subcontracting possibilities.25 These prime contractors are
required to report their subcontract payments (rather than contract awards)2"
to small businesses. As shown in table sixteen, military subcontract payments to
small businesses have amounted to about as much as direct military prime contract
awards to small businesses. In recent years the large prime contractors have reported
Bid prices $S,ooo,ooo
Losses 250,000
1,250,000
TOTAL $1,488,000
Prior to Jan. r, x962 the mandatory requirements were for Sx,ooo,ooo or more, and prior to Jan. x,
x96o the program was voluntary. These changes account for the increasing numbers of large contractors
reporting subcontract payments in recent years. Since not all prime contractors make reports, the sub-
contract payments shown in table 16 are understated.
"The comparison of "prime awards" and "subcontract payments" involves a minor statistical in-
consistency since they are not in the same time phase. On a trend basis, however, this inconsistency can
be largely ignored. Effective July i, 1963 the reporting of subcontracts on a "payment" basis was changed
to a "commitments" or award basis.
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that approximately forty-seven per cent of their total receipts on defense contracts
have in turn been paid out to other business concerns as subcontract payments. Of
these subcontract payments thirty-eight per cent have been made to small businesses.
TABLE 16
SOURCES OF MILITARY BUSINESS RECEIVED BY SMALL BUSINESS FiRMs
BY FISCAL YEARS 1957-1963
(Dollar Amounts in Millions)
1st Half
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 196-i
Prime Awards by Adver-
tised Bidding $1,973 $1,794 $1,466 $1,175 $1,008 $1,089 $ 867 $ 388
Prime Awards by
Negotiated Bidding 1,810 1,985 2,317 2,265 2,649 3,533 3,434 1,528
Total Prime 3,783 3,729 3,783 3,440 3,657 4,622 4,301 1,916
Subcontract Payments
by Large Contractors 3,562 3,242 3,336 3,587 3,495 4,011 4,341 N.A.
Total $7,345 $6,971 $7,119 $7,027 $7,152 $8,633 $8,642
Number of Large Con-
tractors Reporting
Subcontract Payments 298 294 298 298 309 378 453 N.A.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awrards and Subcontdad Paymcnts, July-Dec. 1003, pp. 31,35 and
49.
N.A.: Not available as of March 1, 1904.
In table seventeen the dollar amounts of table sixteen have been converted to
proportions. It is striking to note the trend in the relative importance of the source
and method of receipts for small business firms. Subcontract payments provide
about half of their funds, and this proportion has remained about the same or moved
slightly up during the past seven years. During this period, however, the importance
of advertised bidding as a source of receipts has dropped from twenty-seven per cent
to ten per cent and negotiated bidding has increased from twenty-five per cent to
forty per cent.
This trend has apparently been caused by the decreasing ability of small business
firms to compete effectively for prime awards by advertised bidding methods. As
shown in table eighteen the success of small business firms in this competitive arena
has drastically dropped from almost sixty per cent to less than twenty-five per cent
between 1957 and 1963. During the same period small business firms have been able
to increase their success in negotiated bidding at the prime level from about ten
per cent (1958) to a high of over fifteen per cent (1962). The greatest success for
small business firms, however, is at the subcontract level, where their success ratio
is about thirty-eight per cent of total subcontract payments (as against sixty-two per
cent for large business firms). It should also be noted that close to ioo per cent of
all awards made at the subcontract level are on the basis of negotiated bidding
methods.
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TABLE 17
SOURCES op. MILITARY BUSINESS RECEIVED BY SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS
BY FISCAL YEARS 1957-1963
(Proportion by Source and Method)
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963
Prime Awards by Advertised
Bidding 26.9% 25.8% 20.6% 16.7% 14.1% 12.6% 10.0%
Prime Awards by Negotiated
Bidding 24.6 27.7 32.6 32.2 37.1 40.9 39.7
Total Prime 51.5 53.5 53.2 48.9 51.2 53.5 49.7
Subcontract Payments by Large
Contractors 48.5 46.5 46.8 51.1 48.8 46.5 50.3
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Calculated from table 16 by author.
The importance of subcontracting to small business firms in defense procurement
is repeated to an even greater degree in the procurement program of the Atomic
Energy Commission. Here the prime contract awards to small business are sig-
TABLE I8
RATIO OF SMALL BUSINESS FIRMS TO ALL BUSINESS FIRMS BY SOURCES OF
MILITARY BUSINESS BY FISCAL YEARS 1957-1963
1st Half
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Prime Awards by Adver-
tised Bidding 59.4% 57.6% 47.4% 34.5% 36.2% 31.9% 24.5% 23.8%
Prime Awards by
Negotiated Bidding 11.4% 10.3% 11.8% 12.4% 13.1% 15.5% 14.5% 14.6%
Subcontract Payments
by Large Contractors 38.2% 35.9% 36.5% 37.1% 37.2% 38.0% 38.0% N.A.
Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Prime Contrad Awards and Subcontrad Payments, July-Dec. 1963, prime award
ratios calculated by author from data on p. 34, 35; other data on p. 49.
N.A.: Not available as e Marich 1, 1964.
nificantly lower than in the Department of Defense; this holds true because the
Commission's major procurement is for the operation and construction of large
installations, which require large prime operating contractors that have manpower
and other resources far beyond the capability of small business firms. The large
prime contractors, however, have a major subcontracting program in effect in which
small business firms were successful in winning forty-five per cent of the awards, as
shown in table nineteen. Thus, out of AEC activities, small business firms obtain
only twenty per cent of their receipts from prime contracts and eighty per cent of
their receipts from subcontracts.
If the effect of subcontracting with small business firms is traced beyond the
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ATOMIC ENERGY
TABLE i9
COMMSVnSION PRIME CONTRACT AND SUBCONTRACT AVARDS
SMALL BusINEss FiRms BY FISCAL YEARS I96i-I963
(Dollar Amounts in Millions)
1961 1962 1903
Prime Contract Awards $190 $191 $ 84
Ratio of Small Business Firms to Total
Prime Procurement 7.3% 7.0% 3.2%
Subcontracts Awards $277 $338 S335
Ratio of Small Business Firms to Total
Subcontracts 41.4% 45.9% 45.0%
Source: AEC presentation to the House Select Committee on Small Business, Washington, D. C., Nov. 13,1063, Exhibits 0 and .
first tier (awards made by prime contractors) through the second tier to the Nth tier
subcontract level the relative importance of subcontracting becomes even greater.
For these lower tier subcontract levels the author has estimated that at least fifty
per cent more-or about $2.5 billion dollars more than the $4.3 subcontracted in 1963
at the first tier (see table sixteen)-accrued to small business firms from Department
of Defense programs.
The small businessman is not unaware of this situation and clearly perceives the
advantage of obtaining subcontracts. In the University of Washington survey the
companies were asked, "When you have a choice, what type of defense contract do
you generally prefer to receive?" (by contract level). The responses of those who
indicated a preference are shown in table twenty. For those who expressed a prefer-
ence, subcontracts were thus preferred over prime contracts in the ratio of four to one.
TABLE 20
PREPERENCES OF RESPONDENTS BY CONTRACT LnEv
Number of Firms %
Prime Contract with Government ......................... 155 14.4
Subcontract with Another Company ....................... 632 68.6
No Preference .......................................... 291 27.0
1,078 100.0
No Answer ............................................. 87
1,165
lResponse to question: "When you have a choice, what type of defense contract do you generally prefer to receive?"
Source: ScEmacE, Mancuse SuEmcEram & Bnowx, op.cit. supra table 10, at table 103, p. 105.
CONCLUSION
This paper has tried to present the overall policy and size of federal procurement
with reference to small business firms and to point out some fundamental problem
areas. Due to conceptual problems and to inadequate statistical information it is
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difficult to determine precisely whether small business firms obtain a fair proportion
of government purchases, but the general appearance of the data available suggests
that they do. Although advertised bidding methods are strongly favored by govern-
ment policy, small businessmen have indicated that they strongly prefer negotiated
bidding methods. Finally, small businessmen have indicated they prefer to partici-
pate in government procurement programs as subcontractors to other prime con-
tractors, rather than as prime contractors themselves. The indicated preferences of
small businessmen are backed up by the facts that they derive more of their business
receipts from negotiated bidding than from advertised bidding methods, and that
more of their business receipts are at the subcontract level than at the prime con-
tract level.
